Mike Brewer

Since this forum has hosted several debates about realism vs. idealism in foreign policy (or conservative vs. liberal if you like), I thought it might be a good place to post this article. If anyone is willing to read it, I'd be interested in opinions.

Idealism, Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy
By George Friedman
Iran says it has enriched uranium. Hosni Mubarak is claiming that Shia in Sunni states are traitors to their countries. The French are in political and economic gridlock. With all these urgent things going on, it seems to us that it is time to talk of something important, something that has driven and divided American politics for centuries and will continue to do so: the argument between those who have been called idealists and those who have been labeled realists in U.S. foreign policy.

When the United States was in its infancy, France experienced a revolution that was in many ways similar to the American Revolution. Some Americans wanted to support the French revolutionaries, arguing that the United States had to pursue its moral ideals and stand by its moral partner. Others pointed out that the American economy was heavily dependent on Britain, the major market for American goods. Moreover, the young country relied on its ability to send exports to Europe, and the waters were controlled by Britain. Whatever moral inclinations the Americans might have had toward France, prudence required that they not take on Britain. The idealists tried to frame their arguments strategically and the realists tried to create a moral cast for their argument, but the problem, in the end, was simple: America's survival depended on not alienating a country that was everything the colonists had fought against.

This argument has constantly torn apart American thinking about foreign policy. Consider this example from the more recent past: In World War II, the United States was allied with the Soviet Union, which was ruled by a genocidal maniac, Josef Stalin. At the time that the United States allied with Stalin, Adolf Hitler was only beginning to climb into Stalin's class of killer. There were those who argued that the alliance with Stalin was a betrayal of every principle Americans stood for. Others, like Franklin Roosevelt, recognized that unless the United States allied with Stalin, Hitler likely would win the war. Those who opposed an alliance with Stalin based on moral ideals certainly had an excellent point -- but those who argued that, apart from an alliance with the devil, the Republic might not survive, also had an excellent point.

Consider a final example. In 1972, the United States appeared to be a declining power. It was losing the war in Vietnam, and its position globally appeared to be deteriorating. The Soviet Union had split from China years before, and their confrontation along their frontier had, on occasion, been bloody. War was possible. Richard Nixon created an entente with the Chinese that was designed to encircle the Soviet Union. In retrospect, the strategy worked. However, in establishing relations with Mao's China, the United States once again aligned itself with a murderous regime. The alternative was an unstoppable Soviet regime.

In each of these cases, the United States confronted this dilemma. On one side was the argument that unless the United States stood for its moral ideals, it would survive but lose its soul. Siding with Britain, Stalin or Mao might have been prudent, but it was a shallow prudence that would eliminate the raison d'etre for the American regime. On the other side was the argument that there could be no moral regime unless there was a regime. The United States did not have the strength to resist, on its own, Britain, Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. Without such questionable allies, the moral project would be impossible because the United States either would not survive, or would survive as a spent force.

It is important to note that these arguments cut across political and even ideological grounds. In 1972, people on the left celebrated Nixon's alliance with Mao, and it was the right wing that raised moral doubts. Of course, many on the right supported Nixon and some on the left, not taken by the romance of Maoism, were appalled at the alignment. Similarly, it was the left in World War II that wanted an alliance with the Soviets, and Winston Churchill -- far from a leftist -- stood with them. In other words, the debate has never been an ideologically coherent argument. It has been all over the place.

The current incarnation of this argument concerns the U.S.-jihadist war, and the ideological complexity shows itself quickly.

There are two flavors of idealists here. First, there are those who argue that in waging its war against the jihadists, the United States should never do anything that would violate basic principles of human rights -- and that it should avoid alliances with states that are themselves oppressive. So, for example, some argue that working closely with Saudi Arabia, a kingdom they regard as antithetical to American moral standards, is unacceptable.

There are also those who argue that the primary reason for going to war in the Middle East is to create democracies there. There are two sorts of idealists here. There are the neoconservatives -- some of whom sincerely believe the prodemocracy argument, and others who have adopted it as a justification for military campaigns they supported for other reasons. But alongside the neoconservatives, there are liberals who argue that the protection of "human rights" -- often used interchangeably with "democracy" -- should be the primary justification for any war. Recall liberal support for the Kosovo war as an example.

On the other side of the rhetorical divide are those who make two arguments. The first is that -- as in the historical cases involving Britain, the Soviet Union and China -- the practical reality is that the United States must always work with allies when fighting in the Eastern Hemisphere, and that those allies frequently will be morally repugnant to Americans. In other words, whatever you may think of the Saudis' view of women, an alliance with Saudi Arabia has been indispensable for fighting the war against al Qaeda, regardless of whether the later Iraq campaign was justified. In other words, the argument for alliance in the past remains valid today.

This is extended to the argument that the United States should have as its goal the creation of democracy in the Middle East. The counterargument goes like this: Democracy in the Middle East may be, in some moral sense, a good idea, but American power -- though enormous -- is not infinite. The jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere have not been crushed, and the United States needs regional allies. The Americans, the logic goes, cannot simultaneously seek alliance and try to overthrow regimes.

The idealist argument -- that a country that pursues only its physical and economic security will lose its moral foundation -- is not a frivolous argument. At a certain point, the pursuit of security requires the pursuit of power, and the pursuit of power is corrupting. At the same time, pursuing justice without a sufficiently large sword will get you whipped. And staying out of the fight does not mean that the fight won't come to you. The American moral project can be lost in two ways: through opportunistic corruption or through annihilation.

Politicians do not have the luxury of contemplating the paradox of being. They must make decisions, and inaction is very much a decision. George Washington decided that safety trumped political principle and broadly steered clear of the French revolutionary regime. Franklin Roosevelt saw the path to preserving democracy through alliance with Stalin. Nixon swallowed political principle by flying to Beijing. In retrospect, it is very difficult to see how any of them could have chosen differently. A doctrine emerges in looking at these three examples: the pursuit of political principles is possible only when one is willing to look at the long term; the near term requires ruthless and unsentimental compromise.

Had the idealist demand that the United States never work with oppressive nations been honored, Hitler well might have won World War II. The pursuit of democracy that forces the United States beyond its military and political resources ultimately will weaken democracy. Moral demands that are not rooted in political and military reality achieve the opposite of the desired end. But the realist position also has its weakness. Sometimes being ruthless becomes an end in itself. Sometimes the defense of the national interest becomes a justification for defending one's own interest.

These are not simple matters but, as noted, politicians do not have time to contemplate them for very long. Their natural inclination is to act, and the action they gravitate toward is the pursuit of power. It is interesting to note that the president most often associated with the pursuit of human rights, Abraham Lincoln, was -- in the course of its pursuit -- a ruthless violator of those rights. No one violated constitutional protections more systematically than Lincoln, and no one was more dedicated to those protections. The paradox, however, is simply solved: The path from Point A to Point B is almost never a straight line. Anyone who heads in a straight line will fail. This is a lesson that is equally applicable to the neoconservatives and Amnesty International.

This discussion becomes important now because the United States is pirouetting between factions in the Islamic world. The United States won World War II by pragmatically taking advantage of the totalitarian states and allying with Stalin. The United States won the Cold War by taking advantage of a split between Communist states and allying with China. And viewed from a high level, the United States is in the process of trying to win the jihadist war by taking advantage of the split between Sunnis and Shia and allying with Iran.

There are excellent moral arguments in favor of fighting a war to bring democracy to Iraq. There are excellent moral arguments for never having gotten involved in Iraq in the first place. There are excellent moral arguments for not having gotten into Desert Storm -- against having based troops in Saudi Arabia and getting al Qaeda furious at the United States in the first place. From all directions, the world is filled with outstanding moral arguments, and they have their place.

But first there is the reality that exists now. The United States has too many enemies and too few forces through which to impose its will. As in World War II and the Cold War, splitting the enemy is a practical imperative that precedes all moral imperatives. In this case, that means playing off the various factions within the Muslim world and making the best deal possible with one power or another. In any deal, the United States will wind up allied with someone that the Americans disapprove of, much as their future ally will disapprove of them.

The United States may well wind up making a deal with Iran over Iraq. Alternatively, a Sunni coalition led by Saudi Arabia might give Washington the opportunity to negotiate with the Baathist guerrillas in the Sunni Triangle. Whichever path is followed, it will be condemned by both left and right for dozens of excellent moral reasons.

Bush has been pursuing the path of pragmatism, however clumsily or adroitly, for months now. He will make a deal with someone because going it alone is not an option. The current situation in Iraq cannot be sustained, and all presidents ultimately respond to reality. Bush might have to eat some words about democracy and the United States' commitment thereto, but if Roosevelt could speak of the Four Freedoms while working with Josef Stalin, all things are possible.

Britt

Very interesting read. One of the first comments that it brings to mind is that if we're going to pursue a "realistic" view of working with other nations, let's do it with our eyes wide open to exactly what we're doing, and not in a way that's "idealistically realistic," for lack of a better term; meaning, let's know exactly who we're dealing with and why, and not lose sight of it or convince ourselves down the road that they're in the right when they're just on the right side, right now.

One of my main aggravations in foreign policy and alliances is that we seem so damned short-sighted about it. The author is completely right that we have had to make allies of questionable regimes out of necessity, but we seem to do it purely to meet short term goals and don't look at long term repercussions. The example that springs immediately to mind is the Russian invasion of Afganistan and the subsequent backing of the mujahadeen by the United States. My understanding is that the conventional wisdom at the time was that it was easier to deal with them than with the Afghanis, because "religious zealots were more predictable" in that their motivations were simpler and more transparent.

The other example that comes to mind is the one at the end of the piece itself: FDR and Stalin, particularly at Yalta. We dealt with Stalin at the end of WWII as a comrade-in-arms, and seemed to forget that he was a sociopath we'd formed an alliance of necessity over. I suppose I'm being too harsh, and that it's possible that a lot of the policy missteps of yesterday were simply unforeseeable at the time, but it sure seems like administration after administration is in it for the "quick fix."

Mike Brewer

Britt,
While I understand and agree with much of what you said, my take on the article may have been a little different. I think the author was saying that we indeed need to look at hings with eyes wide open, and not delude ourselves about the morality of immoral acts and alliances. The fact is, there's no way to see the long-term, and sometimes (as in the examples given in the article) the short term alliances that we know will fall apart and that are created with people we despise are absolutely necessary to the survival of the nation.

If you'd have looked at this country in the 30's, there's no way you'd have ever suspected we'd be a world power in just fifty years, let alone the most powerful nation on Earth. It was the short term (and sometimes repugnant) alliances we tolerated that put down larger threats and allowed us to continue to exist. In that respect, I guess it's possible that entertaining these short term alliances really is "seeing the long-term." In other words, the people who have made those decisions and signed those alliances knew that without them, we wouldn't have the luxury of a long term to think about.

Britt

Fair enough. It's probably unfair of me to "armchair quarterback" policy decisions with 20/20 hindsight, a luxury that the people calling the shots at the time just didn't have. Still, I can't help the feeling that too many of those alliances weren't necessary to our existence, and without as much thought to the future as could have been given (this isn't a shot against the article, mind you, I think it's right on the money; it's just the questions I think the article raises). The author raises the possible necessity of making a deal with Iran over Iraq, which is darkly ironic when you think about it; part of the whole problem with Iraq was that were were concerned that Saddam Hussein hadn't destroyed the chemical and biological weapons that we supplied him for the Iran-Iraq war. Now the tables have turned, we've started a war of our own over those very weapons, and one possible plan for extricating ourselves from that war involves enlisting the help of the people we were arming him to fight in the first place (or perhaps one discarded plan, I suspect that with Iran's recent uranium claims we may not be coyzing up with them anytime soon).

That's what I mean when I say I suspect that we may sometimes suffer from an idealistic view of what is realistically necessary: that in the past we may have been too quick to subscribe to the "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" view, and that making allies on largely the basis that they oppose what we consider to be enemy regimes may not be the best policy to follow in all circumstances. I don't mean to say that it's not necessary, or that we shouldn't make allies that we find morally questionable. You're right, we don't have that luxury. I'm just hoping we don't throw the baby out with the bathwater and forget that just because we occassionally need to doesn't mean it isn't going to sometimes be a snake that bites us.

Mike Brewer

Consider regarding the Iran thing that the reason we're dealing has to do with both countries, and not just Iraq. War is obviously a last-resort option, and if diplomacy works, then we've achieved a number of other goals as well. And on that note, don't be surprised to see us attempt to "cozy up" even more. At least in the diplomatic sense. I think at this point, our own politicians are smart enough to see that need to very openly and very publicly continue efforts to reach solutions with Iran that don't involve going to war. Diplomacy has obviously been going on between us and Iran for a long time - in fact, Iran's intelligence services have dropped some pretty useful information about al Qaeda to both us and European nations. Their motivations are anything but concern for our interests and have a lot more to do with a desire on the part of Ahmadenijad to make Iran the cultural and religious center of the Islamic world, but there has been give and take between us for some time. There still exists an obvious (and maybe a not-so-obvious) threat there, though. Aside from their nukes and pursuits thereof, there are guys like Mugniyah (Imad Fayez, of Beirut and al-Qaeda in Iraq note) out there trying to make sure that alliances with Iran and al-Qaeda will solidify, teaching Iraqi bombers how to use things like propane and butane to boost IEDs along the way. Still, after the criticism people have voiced about Bush opting for war without letting diplomacy run its course (not to mention the fact that people bought into the line after ten years of diplomacy attempts with Saddam failed), I don't think any politician can afford not to attempt diplomatic relations with Iran, regardless of how awful they may be.

You're right on the money about people trying to make "realism" an idealistic pursuit, though. As I recall, more than one person here got mad at me (from both the lib and conservative sides) for saying that war with Iraq was less about the spread of democracy or toppling of Saddam and more about containing Iran, purposefully destabilizing the Arab world in the only Arab country where it would be tolerated, and givning us more intel resources in areas where we had been woefully lacking prior to the Iraq war. My take on it was a little less "press-friendly" than what people wanted to hear, but I think it's proving to be true. If Iran and Syria still had easy access to one another, if we didn't have so much on the spot human intelligence along two of Iran's borders, and if we hadn't placed such a US presence where (and when) we did, we wouldn't even have the option of diplomacy with Iran right now. In their eyes, we did them quite the favor by getting rid of Saddam. It's a gamble, and we'll have to wait and see if it pays off the way I think it will - it will depend a lot on the sorts of alliances we're discussing here. But in the face of the alternatives, I believe history will show that what we've done and what we're doing were at least prudent choices, if not the best ones. The statement "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" has never been true, you're right. You always have to be aware and ready for for the possibility that the enemy of my enemy might turn around and try to kill me once our common enemy is gone. But ask yourself something:

How do you make sure you're ready?

The answer might be as easy as, "By becoming the most powerful nation on Earth and staying that way."

Sometimes, you just have to be the guy with the bigger stick.

Britt

Wow, I had never heard anything about Iran providing us with Al Queda intelligence at all. You must have better access to intel than I do. Is that ongoing? Pretty much all I see in the media is near-panic over their nuclear capabilities, and most everything I've read on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paints him out as a scary nutjob with an apolcaylptic vison of the return of the Hidden Imam, the last guy you want playing with nuclear weapons.

I remember reading your analysis of the current Iraq war; you gave me some reading you wanted me to take a look at, and now I have to admit I haven't read it yet.

I'll comment more later, right now I'm late for class! See ya shortly -

Mike Brewer

It's possible...

Mainly, though, I think it's because I stay away from mainstream media. I get a lot of my "news" from State Department bulletins, Stratfor, and searching foreign local news sources in the countries that pique my curiosity.

Mainly Iran tries to undermine Al Qaeda because al Qaeda is such a powerful force among muslim radicals that they threaten to become the center of gravity for those folks. Iran sees itself as the only remaining "pillar of Islam" and often does things that will undermine al Qaeda so that they (Iran) can be seen as the "real" center of Islam. Really, it's a battle of egos that al Qaeda would like to see end, but that Iran can only accept if they're on top. Iran sees the West as a threat to its way of life, but it sees al Qaeda as a threat to its standing within the muslim community, and it regards Osama's brand of Islam (Wahhabism) as a corruption. Because of that, Iran takes some pleasure in foiling al Qaeda's efforts precisely so that they can point and say, "See? They aren't so great!" In the end, though, they still hate us and everything we stand for.

aseepish

Interesting article, even if it is a re-stating of Kissinger's argument in his book Diplomacy. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articl...36/ai_15593327

The interesting thing is that while realist policy does the most to advance America's national intersts, the American people do not respond well to it. You cannot sell a foreign policy without appealing to idealism.

__________________
"It was about that time I realized that searching was my symbol, the emblem of those who go out at night with nothing in mind, the motives of a destroyer of compasses." -Cortázar

Garland

WHAT'S GOING ON?! Journal articles and abstracts?!! This place is suddenly rife with academic references and well thought out and constructed arguments??? Where am I? Who are you people?!

By the way... a "realistic" approach to anything is going to be relative, because everyone's subjective reality differs. Everybody sees things from a different light because everyone has fallen into a certain place in the vast spectrum of belief structures based on essentially everything that has shaped that person, including their nature and what they've been brought up in. My reality is not the same as a silver spoon fed brat, nor is it the same as an abused street kid.

As individuals, we need to stop making these huge umbrella categories that split us down the middle on issues...because, man...we are spliton everything. People have different opinions on everything, and the same person who spits an extremely liberal "ideal" can also approach another idea from a very conservative and, "real", perspective.

There is one other thing I'd like to say...Liberal does NOT mean what it used to mean. Liberal was a term used to represent people wanting less interferance from the government...and now all "liberals" do are bitch and moan about their own special interests, or try to create blanket laws to take away people's freedoms. (i.e. anti-gun laws, politically correct language, PETa, and the people who want to prevent 3rd world loggers from making enough money to feed their families, because it's WRONG to cut down trees...****'em, right?)
Conservatives, still want shit to stay the same in the arenas of industry and the economy, but now they are overrun with psycho, apocalyptasist, bible thumpers who want to encroach upon people's sexual privacy (i.e. gay marraige, abortion laws, english only, intellegent design, the drug war...which may have larger implications than drugs and a plethora of other agendas behind it.)...or shady characters who want to do the same thing through creating panic amongst the masses in order to control what the media will and can say, as well as the whole of the patriot act, the "war on terror", wiretapping, anti-immigration laws...etc.

SO essentially, now we have two different groups of assholes who want to take away our rights...and you're either one or the other?

I won't commit with either group....I'm me. Sometimes I agree with one or the other's stance on a particular issue...but sometimes...they both seem fucking nuts.

__________________
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No, no...no no no...whatever you are drinking, you need much, much more...and then to sleep. - jubaji

Mike Brewer

Garland,
You're right in that the labels are divisive and that they don't mean what they used to. However, if it makes you feel any better, "realist" and "idealist" are just terms used in foreign affairs / international relations to describe an ideology. They don't refer to any real definition of the words themelves, but try to describe the differences in the philosophies of each "party." Realists tend to see the world as a place of compromise and they view international relations through a lens of how to ensure a nation's success by accumulating and applying political power. Idealists tend to look at the world of international relations through a lens of ideals, morals, and principles - in the purest sense, placing then above pragmatism. Try to think of the terms more as "industry jargon" than anything else.

Aseepish -
Nicely done. Regarding Kissinger, what's your opinion on his aproach (and overall viewpoint) that stabilization of power was essential? It certainly didn't bring any peace in his time, and it may have created a lot of the enemies we're fighting now. However, I still believe that concessions need to be made, even in the name of temporary alliances from time to time. I've always thought Kissinger was soemthing of an enigma in that he built his philosophies around (basically) what Truman out out there, but the way he promoted those policies made them stick realy up until this current administration. Was he right? Does "Kissinger doctrine" apply today as it did back then? What do you think?

aseepish

I think that Kissinger's approach made a lot of sense during the cold war, where strategic stability was more important a goal than peace. The scary thing is that post 9/11, things changed. Traditional balance of power means nothing to jihadists. A rival nation can be contained and balanced, but a terrorist cell cannot. Realpolitik works when all the actors involved are rational. Suicide is an irrational act.

Zero-sum cold war thinking (a state is either with us or against us) is also obsolete. A nation's government (Take Saudi Arabia as an example) can be pro-US, but its population is not. Back in the day where the threat of a nation came from its government and its military, winning over the government was enough. Now terrorists are recruited from the civilian population regardless of a government's position.

Traditional realist foreign policy is unconcerned about foreign public opinion, only about hard issues of security and stability. So I think that a Kissinger-flavoured approach is useful when dealing with potential enemies Iran and North Korea (as irrational as their leaders appear, they still behave rationally on an international level), as well as quasi-friendly states such as Russia and China. Stability is still important on the Korean peninsula and the Indian Sub-continent. But the real danger these days is not from traditional nation-states, but from terrorist cells that are increasingly violent and effective. This is where Kissinger's approach makes less sense.

__________________
"It was about that time I realized that searching was my symbol, the emblem of those who go out at night with nothing in mind, the motives of a destroyer of compasses." -Cortázar

aseepish

I think most of what you learn in poli-sci/IR courses is what all the jargon means.

Here's a good starting point for realist theory: Hans Morgenthau http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm

A good general text: Martin Wight's International Theory:The Three Traditions.

__________________
"It was about that time I realized that searching was my symbol, the emblem of those who go out at night with nothing in mind, the motives of a destroyer of compasses." -Cortázar

aseepish

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/068...lance&n=283155

Kissinger's post 9/11 writing. I haven't read it yet though.

__________________
"It was about that time I realized that searching was my symbol, the emblem of those who go out at night with nothing in mind, the motives of a destroyer of compasses." -Cortázar

Mike Brewer

I wholeheartedly agree that it applied a lot more during the Cold War than in the present day. I guess what I'm looking for is your opinion on this:

Regardless of how relevant (or successful) the policy was during the Cold War, how do you think striving for stability (or purposeful instability, as it so often turned out) affected the modern picture we face now? In other words, do you think that working so hard to keep a "balance of power" by supporting the underdogs against our "big" enemy ended up creating the very environment that you illustrated? Could our ultimately successful policy of helping the underdog and waging war against communism in peripheral battlefields have turned those peripheral battlefields into the enemies of modern day?

I guess I've often looked at it from the standpoint of foreign policy and international relations always being a self-defeating cycle, given a long enough timeline. Every strategy, every approach - no matter how successful - has its critics. And by virtue of the fact that someone always feels as though they've "lost" in these situations, the possibility and potential for that "defeated minority" to come back as an enemy is always there. Since there is no real way to make sure everyone on Earth is happy with the outcome of a compromise, it makes me wonder if in fact every strategy enjoys success only as long as it takes for the defeated minority to rise up against it. I'm not saying there's a better answer out there, but it's interesting to look at.

People are fond of saying things like "The people we trained and armed are the same people we now have to fight!" But it's really always been that way, and in every civilization. It's not a lack of vision or foresight - rather, I think it's just human nature. History tells things one way, and the losers remember it another way. Eventually, the conquered always rise up. It's just the way things always seem to work out. Strange that people think it is only a modern, American issue.

aseepish

It's true - there isn't a policy that doesn't have potential negative consequences, foreseen or unforeseen. A country can't persue its interests without stepping on toes and making enemies. During the Cold War the idea that the ends justified the means facilitated a lot of unsavoury alliances and policies.

Case in point - US support for the Shah of Iran lead to the anti-American bent of the Iranian revolution, Iranian support for Hezbollah and other terrorist movements, and ultimately the current stand-off with Iran.

In the end, stability is temporary, for the reason that one country's security and stability is another's insecurity. Managing this is the supreme challenge of foreign relations.

__________________
"It was about that time I realized that searching was my symbol, the emblem of those who go out at night with nothing in mind, the motives of a destroyer of compasses." -Cortázar